The MIT Faculty has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
s the "baby boomers" approach and enter their retirement years, the accus the "baby boomers" approach and enter their retirement years, the accumulation phase of their life-cycle is nearly over. Thus, the focus of many mulation phase of their life-cycle is nearly over. Thus, the focus of many researchers, fi nancial services fi rms, and public policymakers concerned researchers, fi nancial services fi rms, and public policymakers concerned with retirement saving is shifting from the accumulation of resources while working with retirement saving is shifting from the accumulation of resources while working to the drawdown of resources during retirement. to the drawdown of resources during retirement.
Retired households are dependent on the annuitized income streams that Retired households are dependent on the annuitized income streams that they have built up during their working careers and on the wealth that they have they have built up during their working careers and on the wealth that they have accumulated in other forms. The two most common annuitized income streams are accumulated in other forms. The two most common annuitized income streams are Social Security benefi ts and the payments from defi ned benefi t pension plans. These Social Security benefi ts and the payments from defi ned benefi t pension plans. These payout streams provide income for life-and thus provide some protection against payout streams provide income for life-and thus provide some protection against falling into poverty if one lives an especially long life. The three most common falling into poverty if one lives an especially long life. The three most common sources of accumulated wealth are equity in an owner-occupied home, fi nancial sources of accumulated wealth are equity in an owner-occupied home, fi nancial assets such as bonds and stocks, and fi nancial assets held in a personal retirement assets such as bonds and stocks, and fi nancial assets held in a personal retirement account such as an Individual Retirement Arrangement or a 401(k) plan. account such as an Individual Retirement Arrangement or a 401(k) plan.
Throughout our analysis, we will defi ne "retirement-age households" as those Throughout our analysis, we will defi ne "retirement-age households" as those headed by someone between the ages of 65 and 69. In 2008, just over 80 percent of headed by someone between the ages of 65 and 69. In 2008, just over 80 percent of these households had some equity in their home or another property, while 52 percent these households had some equity in their home or another property, while 52 percent had assets in personal retirement accounts. A much higher fraction-87 percenthad assets in personal retirement accounts. A much higher fraction-87 percenthad some fi nancial assets outside their retirement accounts, but for many househad some fi nancial assets outside their retirement accounts, but for many households the amount of such assets was relatively modest. Only 45 percent had more holds the amount of such assets was relatively modest. Only 45 percent had more than $20,000 in non-retirement-account fi nancial assets. The median fi nancial than $20,000 in non-retirement-account fi nancial assets. The median fi nancial asset holding for this group, including holdings in personal retirement accounts, asset holding for this group, including holdings in personal retirement accounts, is $52,000. In short, many households have small enough amounts of accumulated is $52,000. In short, many households have small enough amounts of accumulated wealth that they will depend heavily on the life-contingent payout streams offered wealth that they will depend heavily on the life-contingent payout streams offered by Social Security and, if they have one, a defi ned benefi t pension. by Social Security and, if they have one, a defi ned benefi t pension.
This paper presents evidence on the resources available to households as they This paper presents evidence on the resources available to households as they enter retirement. It draws heavily on data collected by the Health and Retirement enter retirement. It draws heavily on data collected by the Health and Retirement Study, which we sometimes refer to as the "HRS." We calculate the "potential addiStudy, which we sometimes refer to as the "HRS." We calculate the "potential additional annuity income" that households could purchase, given their holdings of tional annuity income" that households could purchase, given their holdings of non-annuitized fi nancial assets at the start of retirement. Even if households used all non-annuitized fi nancial assets at the start of retirement. Even if households used all of their fi nancial assets inside and outside personal retirement accounts to purchase of their fi nancial assets inside and outside personal retirement accounts to purchase a life annuity, only 47 percent of households between the ages of 65 and 69 in 2008 a life annuity, only 47 percent of households between the ages of 65 and 69 in 2008 could increase their life-contingent income by more than $5,000 per year. At the could increase their life-contingent income by more than $5,000 per year. At the upper end of the wealth distribution, however, a substantial number of households upper end of the wealth distribution, however, a substantial number of households could make large annuity purchases. We also consider the role of housing equity could make large annuity purchases. We also consider the role of housing equity in the portfolios of retirement-age households and explore the extent to which in the portfolios of retirement-age households and explore the extent to which households draw down housing equity and fi nancial assets as they age. We fi nd that households draw down housing equity and fi nancial assets as they age. We fi nd that many households appear to treat housing equity and non-annuitized fi nancial assets many households appear to treat housing equity and non-annuitized fi nancial assets as "precautionary savings," tending to draw them down only when they experience as "precautionary savings," tending to draw them down only when they experience a shock such as the death of a spouse or a period of substantial medical outlays. a shock such as the death of a spouse or a period of substantial medical outlays. Because home equity is often conserved until very late in life, for many households Because home equity is often conserved until very late in life, for many households it may provide some insurance against the risk of living longer than expected. A it may provide some insurance against the risk of living longer than expected. A brief conclusion summarizes our fi ndings and indicates how they bear on a number brief conclusion summarizes our fi ndings and indicates how they bear on a number of policy issues, such as the role for annuity defaults in retirement saving plans. of policy issues, such as the role for annuity defaults in retirement saving plans.
Social Security, Housing Equity, and Household Balance Sheets at Social Security, Housing Equity, and Household Balance Sheets at Retirement Retirement
To set the stage for our analysis of fi nancial support for retirement, we begin To set the stage for our analysis of fi nancial support for retirement, we begin by describing the balance sheets of households headed by someone between the by describing the balance sheets of households headed by someone between the ages of 65 Table 1 presents fi nancial downturn that occurred in September and October 2008. Table 1 presents summary information on asset holdings. The table is divided into three panels: for summary information on asset holdings. The table is divided into three panels: for all households, single-person households, and married households, respectively. all households, single-person households, and married households, respectively. Mean non-annuitized wealth (in 2008 dollars) for households in this age range is Mean non-annuitized wealth (in 2008 dollars) for households in this age range is $567,496. The median, which is not reported in the table, is much lower: $221,700. $567,496. The median, which is not reported in the table, is much lower: $221,700. The non-annuitized asset categories that are owned by the most households are The non-annuitized asset categories that are owned by the most households are fi nancial assets (86.7 percent), home equity or other equity in a real property fi nancial assets (86.7 percent), home equity or other equity in a real property (81.3 percent), and personal retirement accounts (52.2 percent). Equity in real (81.3 percent), and personal retirement accounts (52.2 percent). Equity in real estate represents roughly half of non-annuitized wealth, while fi nancial assets held estate represents roughly half of non-annuitized wealth, while fi nancial assets held outside personal retirement accounts represent 23 percent, and personal retireoutside personal retirement accounts represent 23 percent, and personal retirement accounts represent another 21 percent. Each of these wealth components ment accounts represent another 21 percent. Each of these wealth components represents a smaller share of total wealth, since non-annuitized wealth comprises represents a smaller share of total wealth, since non-annuitized wealth comprises just over half of total wealth. There are substantial differences between married just over half of total wealth. There are substantial differences between married and single households in the relative importance of various asset categories. For and single households in the relative importance of various asset categories. For example, personal retirement accounts are roughly twice as large a share of nonexample, personal retirement accounts are roughly twice as large a share of nonannuitized wealth for married couples as for single individuals. annuitized wealth for married couples as for single individuals.
The fi gures for Social Security and defi ned benefi t pension plans represent The fi gures for Social Security and defi ned benefi t pension plans represent a capitalized value of the future stream of income. We calculate capitalized values a capitalized value of the future stream of income. We calculate capitalized values by assuming that reported Social Security benefi ts represent an infl ation-indexed by assuming that reported Social Security benefi ts represent an infl ation-indexed annuity that provides full spousal benefi ts after the death of the primary benefi ciary. annuity that provides full spousal benefi ts after the death of the primary benefi ciary. We assume that defi ned benefi t pensions also provide a life annuity for the current We assume that defi ned benefi t pensions also provide a life annuity for the current (-$3,697) are included in net worth and non-annuitized wealth, but are not in any of the subcategories (fi nancial assets, personal retirement accounts, or housing and other real estate). The sum of these three sub-categories therefore does not equal non-annuitized wealth.
benefi ciary and that spousal benefi ts will equal half the benefi ts for the primary benefi ciary and that spousal benefi ts will equal half the benefi ts for the primary benefi ciary, an approximation based on the fi ndings in Johnson, Uccello, and benefi ciary, an approximation based on the fi ndings in Johnson, Uccello, and Goldwyn (2005) . We further assume that the average annual increase in defi ned Goldwyn (2005) . We further assume that the average annual increase in defi ned benefi t pension payments will equal one-third of the increase in the Consumer Price benefi t pension payments will equal one-third of the increase in the Consumer Price Index infl ation rate. Brown (2010) suggests that this assumption roughly describes Index infl ation rate. Brown (2010) suggests that this assumption roughly describes the recent experience of benefi ciaries from such plans. We aggregate payouts from the recent experience of benefi ciaries from such plans. We aggregate payouts from private annuity contracts, which are reported by very few respondents in this survey, private annuity contracts, which are reported by very few respondents in this survey, with payouts from defi ned benefi t plans. with payouts from defi ned benefi t plans.
To compute the expected present discounted value of life-contingent payout To compute the expected present discounted value of life-contingent payout streams, we use the survival probabilities that were projected in the Social Secustreams, we use the survival probabilities that were projected in the Social Security Administration's 2006 life table under the assumption that spousal mortality rity Administration's 2006 life table under the assumption that spousal mortality rates are independent. We also adopt the "intermediate" nominal interest rate and rates are independent. We also adopt the "intermediate" nominal interest rate and infl ation assumptions in Board of Trustees (2008) , which correspond to long-term infl ation assumptions in Board of Trustees (2008) , which correspond to long-term interest rates of 4.4 percent in 2008, with a gradual rise to 5.8 percent in 2012 and interest rates of 4.4 percent in 2008, with a gradual rise to 5.8 percent in 2012 and then a drop to 5.7 percent in 2017 and in all future years. Actual interest rates in the then a drop to 5.7 percent in 2017 and in all future years. Actual interest rates in the period since 2008 have been lower than these assumptions. period since 2008 have been lower than these assumptions.
The data in Table 1 show that the average capitalized value of Social Security for The data in Table 1 show that the average capitalized value of Social Security for all retirement-age households is $341,556. For those households who receive some all retirement-age households is $341,556. For those households who receive some Social Security income, the corresponding mean is $387,200. There is less disperSocial Security income, the corresponding mean is $387,200. There is less dispersion in the capitalized value of Social Security benefi ts than in many of the other sion in the capitalized value of Social Security benefi ts than in many of the other components of wealth. The mean capitalized values of Social Security and defi ned components of wealth. The mean capitalized values of Social Security and defi ned benefi t pension payouts, taken together, represent 46 percent of the mean value of benefi t pension payouts, taken together, represent 46 percent of the mean value of household wealth. These fi ndings are broadly consistent with Butrica and Mermin's household wealth. These fi ndings are broadly consistent with Butrica and Mermin's (2006) analysis of earlier waves of the Health and Retirement Study, which found (2006) analysis of earlier waves of the Health and Retirement Study, which found that married couples on average held 55 percent of their wealth in annuitized form, that married couples on average held 55 percent of their wealth in annuitized form, while unmarried individuals held 59 percent in this form. while unmarried individuals held 59 percent in this form. Table 1 also highlights the importance of housing equity, mostly in owner-occupied Table 1 also highlights the importance of housing equity, mostly in owner-occupied homes but also including second homes and other real estate, as a component of homes but also including second homes and other real estate, as a component of household net worth for households of retirement age. Table 1 does not report the household net worth for households of retirement age. Table 1 does not report the components of real estate equity, but on average, home equity in a primary residence components of real estate equity, but on average, home equity in a primary residence accounts for 16.8 percent of net worth for 65-69 year-old households. Adding equity accounts for 16.8 percent of net worth for 65-69 year-old households. Adding equity in second homes and in other real estate brings the total to 25.9 percent. These assets in second homes and in other real estate brings the total to 25.9 percent. These assets loom even larger as a share of non-annuitized household net worth: 31.0 percent loom even larger as a share of non-annuitized household net worth: 31.0 percent for owner-occupied housing equity and 47.9 percent for all real estate. While many for owner-occupied housing equity and 47.9 percent for all real estate. While many households in the cohort of the baby boomers' parents were able to avoid tapping households in the cohort of the baby boomers' parents were able to avoid tapping their housing equity to cover other outlays until late in life, whether this pattern will their housing equity to cover other outlays until late in life, whether this pattern will apply to the baby boomers as well remains an open question. apply to the baby boomers as well remains an open question.
We should mention a few caveats about these estimates. First, our calculation of We should mention a few caveats about these estimates. First, our calculation of Social Security and defi ned benefi t pension wealth is based on the level of benefi ts Social Security and defi ned benefi t pension wealth is based on the level of benefi ts households received on the interview date in 2008. Some households in the 65-69 age households received on the interview date in 2008. Some households in the 65-69 age range who were still working, or who were retired but deferred the receipt of these range who were still working, or who were retired but deferred the receipt of these income streams, may have substantial accumulated wealth in the form of annuity income streams, may have substantial accumulated wealth in the form of annuity benefi ts, but we would not detect it. Second, offers some evidence that benefi ts, but we would not detect it. Second, offers some evidence that data from the Health and Retirement Study may underreport assets held in 401(k) data from the Health and Retirement Study may underreport assets held in 401(k) and other similar defi ned contribution retirement plans. Third, our analysis does and other similar defi ned contribution retirement plans. Third, our analysis does not consider the tax treatment of the income from, or the sale of, different kinds not consider the tax treatment of the income from, or the sale of, different kinds of assets held at retirement age. of assets held at retirement age. 1 1 Finally, Table 1 omits the value of payments from Finally, Table 1 omits the value of payments from Medicare and Medicaid. Data on average Medicare and Medicaid benefi ts by age Medicare and Medicaid. Data on average Medicare and Medicaid benefi ts by age can be used to estimate the expected present discounted value of these insurance can be used to estimate the expected present discounted value of these insurance programs. For the average 65-year-old, the present discounted value of the medical programs. For the average 65-year-old, the present discounted value of the medical care that Medicare and Medicaid will cover is approximately $180,000. When added care that Medicare and Medicaid will cover is approximately $180,000. When added to the net worth shown in Table 1 , Medicare and Medicaid "wealth" would account to the net worth shown in Table 1 , Medicare and Medicaid "wealth" would account for about 22 percent of wealth for single-person households and 21 percent of wealth for about 22 percent of wealth for single-person households and 21 percent of wealth for married couples. for married couples.
The means in Table 1 conceal substantial heterogeneity in the distribution of The means in Table 1 conceal substantial heterogeneity in the distribution of wealth holdings. Table 2 provides some information on wealth dispersion, reporting wealth holdings. Table 2 provides some information on wealth dispersion, reporting several percentiles in the distribution of housing equity, fi nancial assets, assets in several percentiles in the distribution of housing equity, fi nancial assets, assets in Table 2 . A similar pattern obtains for fi nancial assets. tile value in Table 2 . A similar pattern obtains for fi nancial assets.
The distribution of the capitalized value of defi ned benefi t pension payouts The distribution of the capitalized value of defi ned benefi t pension payouts resembles that for assets in personal retirement accounts, with a median value resembles that for assets in personal retirement accounts, with a median value of zero, but one household in fi ve has defi ned benefi t pension wealth of at least of zero, but one household in fi ve has defi ned benefi t pension wealth of at least $238,500. Defi ned benefi t pension plans have been declining in the private sector $238,500. Defi ned benefi t pension plans have been declining in the private sector in the last two decades, so annuities from this source will be less prevalent for in the last two decades, so annuities from this source will be less prevalent for future cohorts. The dispersion of the capitalized value of Social Security benefi ts is future cohorts. The dispersion of the capitalized value of Social Security benefi ts is substantial but much smaller than that for the other balance sheet components. A substantial but much smaller than that for the other balance sheet components. A household at the 30 household at the 30 th th percentile of the Social Security benefi t distribution has Social percentile of the Social Security benefi t distribution has Social Security wealth with a capitalized value of $214,500, while a household at the 90 Security wealth with a capitalized value of $214,500, while a household at the 90 th th percentile has $643,100. percentile has $643,100.
The lower panels of Table 2 highlight differences in the distributions of wealth for The lower panels of Table 2 highlight differences in the distributions of wealth for single-person and married households as they enter retirement. The median net worth single-person and married households as they enter retirement. The median net worth of married households is more than twice that of single-person households. A similar of married households is more than twice that of single-person households. A similar pattern is observed for most asset subcategories and across the wealth distribution. pattern is observed for most asset subcategories and across the wealth distribution. For example, the median married couple between the ages of 65 and 69 has housing For example, the median married couple between the ages of 65 and 69 has housing equity of $170,000, while the median single person has housing equity of $60,000. equity of $170,000, while the median single person has housing equity of $60,000. More than 30 percent of single households report no housing equity, while more than More than 30 percent of single households report no housing equity, while more than 90 percent of married households have some housing equity. A much higher fraction 90 percent of married households have some housing equity. A much higher fraction of single than married households report very low levels of fi nancial assets. We note of single than married households report very low levels of fi nancial assets. We note also that there is considerable heterogeneity within single-person households. Those also that there is considerable heterogeneity within single-person households. Those who have never been married are better prepared for retirement than the surviving who have never been married are better prepared for retirement than the surviving members of married couples. Much of the attention in discussions of retirement members of married couples. Much of the attention in discussions of retirement preparation focuses on households in the bottom half of the wealth distribution. preparation focuses on households in the bottom half of the wealth distribution. These households typically have very little nonhousing wealth and they are unlikely These households typically have very little nonhousing wealth and they are unlikely to have a defi ned benefi t pension. Consequently, they rely heavily on Social Security. to have a defi ned benefi t pension. Consequently, they rely heavily on Social Security. However, a substantial number of households have accumulated signifi cant wealth as However, a substantial number of households have accumulated signifi cant wealth as they enter retirement. The median net worth values at the 70 they enter retirement. The median net worth values at the 70 th th and 90 and 90 th th percentiles percentiles asset with accrued capital gains. Social Security may be partly tax-exempt, but its tax treatment depends on a household's total income level. Defi ned benefi t pensions are generally taxable. The equity in an owner-occupied home is largely tax-exempt, although gains that exceed $500,000 are subject to capital gains taxation, while all gains on the sales of second homes are subject to capital gains taxation. Sales of business assets would also typically be subject to capital gains tax.
of the net worth distribution are roughly $1.1 million and $2.1 million, respectively, of the net worth distribution are roughly $1.1 million and $2.1 million, respectively, including the capitalized value of Social Security and defi ned benefi t pensions. The including the capitalized value of Social Security and defi ned benefi t pensions. The median levels of non-annuitized assets at the 70 median levels of non-annuitized assets at the 70 th th and 90 and 90 th th percentiles of the distribupercentiles of the distribution are roughly $500,000 and $1.3 million. tion are roughly $500,000 and $1.3 million.
Potential Annuity Income Potential Annuity Income
Economists have long been puzzled by the limited size of the private annuity Economists have long been puzzled by the limited size of the private annuity market. Yaari (1965) recognized that in a basic life-cycle model with stochastic market. Yaari (1965) recognized that in a basic life-cycle model with stochastic mortality but no uncertainty about consumption needs and no bequest motives, mortality but no uncertainty about consumption needs and no bequest motives, consumers should fully annuitize their wealth at retirement if an actuarially fair consumers should fully annuitize their wealth at retirement if an actuarially fair annuity market exists. In this case, length of life is the only uncertainty facing older annuity market exists. In this case, length of life is the only uncertainty facing older households. Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond (2005) demonstrate that even in much households. Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond (2005) demonstrate that even in much more general economic environments, consumers should still fi nd partial annuitimore general economic environments, consumers should still fi nd partial annuitization attractive. zation attractive.
To evaluate the capacity of retirement-age households to purchase suppleTo evaluate the capacity of retirement-age households to purchase supplemental private annuities, we compute "potential additional annuity income" for mental private annuities, we compute "potential additional annuity income" for each household in our dataset by converting their stocks of fi nancial assets into each household in our dataset by converting their stocks of fi nancial assets into annual income streams. Some of the calculations underlying the entries in Tables 1 annual income streams. Some of the calculations underlying the entries in Tables 1  and 2 involve converting annuitized income streams from Social Security and and 2 involve converting annuitized income streams from Social Security and defi ned benefi t pensions into stocks of wealth. Now, we do the reverse by annuidefi ned benefi t pensions into stocks of wealth. Now, we do the reverse by annuitizing fi nancial wealth holdings. tizing fi nancial wealth holdings. Table 3 provides information on annuity payout rates in the private market Table 3 provides information on annuity payout rates in the private market and in a synthetic, actuarially fair annuity market. The upper panel shows average and in a synthetic, actuarially fair annuity market. The upper panel shows average annuity payouts for the sample of fi rms whose annuity products are included on the annuity payouts for the sample of fi rms whose annuity products are included on the AnnuityShopper website. The table shows the average payout rate for the annuity AnnuityShopper website. The table shows the average payout rate for the annuity policies for which this website presented data in its July 2008 information release; policies for which this website presented data in its July 2008 information release; the data are based on annuity policies offered in late spring and early summer the data are based on annuity policies offered in late spring and early summer 2008. The data illustrate the importance of age, gender, and the presence of an 2008. The data illustrate the importance of age, gender, and the presence of an infl ation-adjusting cost-of-living provision in annuity pricing. For a 65 year-old man infl ation-adjusting cost-of-living provision in annuity pricing. For a 65 year-old man who purchases a $100,000 immediate, level-payment annuity without infl ation who purchases a $100,000 immediate, level-payment annuity without infl ation protection, the annual payout would be $8,460-or 8.46 percent of the annuity's protection, the annual payout would be $8,460-or 8.46 percent of the annuity's purchase price. If the same individual annuity buyer picked an annuity stream with purchase price. If the same individual annuity buyer picked an annuity stream with a 3 percent per year escalator, the annual payout in the fi rst year would be only a 3 percent per year escalator, the annual payout in the fi rst year would be only $6,470. The escalating annuity is the closest approximation to an infl ation-indexed $6,470. The escalating annuity is the closest approximation to an infl ation-indexed annuity; the market for true infl ation-protected annuities is very limited. annuity; the market for true infl ation-protected annuities is very limited.
The lower panel in Table 3 presents the actuarially fair annuity payout, calcuThe lower panel in Table 3 presents the actuarially fair annuity payout, calculated using the Social Security Administration's (SSA's) 2006 population mortality lated using the Social Security Administration's (SSA's) 2006 population mortality table for an individual with the mortality experience of the population at large. table for an individual with the mortality experience of the population at large. 3 3 These payouts are higher than those in the AnnuityShopper data, in part because These payouts are higher than those in the AnnuityShopper data, in part because the mortality rates from the Social Security Administration are higher than those the mortality rates from the Social Security Administration are higher than those in the current annuitant population as a result of self-selection of those who will on in the current annuitant population as a result of self-selection of those who will on average live longer into the existing private annuity market, and in part because the average live longer into the existing private annuity market, and in part because the SSA's projected interest rates are higher than prevailing market rates. SSA's projected interest rates are higher than prevailing market rates.
The entries in Table 3 provide a guide to the rates at which single individuals The entries in Table 3 provide a guide to the rates at which single individuals can transform accumulated assets into streams of lifetime income. For married indican transform accumulated assets into streams of lifetime income. For married individuals, annuitization often involves a decision about the extent of spousal protection viduals, annuitization often involves a decision about the extent of spousal protection in the event that the annuitant predeceases his or her spouse. The AnnuityShopper in the event that the annuitant predeceases his or her spouse. The AnnuityShopper data also provide rates for joint and survivor annuities, although these are not shown data also provide rates for joint and survivor annuities, although these are not shown 3 The assumptions here are the same as those used to calculate the present discounted value of Social Security and defi ned benefi t pension payouts above. For a 65 year-old man, for example, we solve for P in the equation
We truncate the sum at age 119, since the probability of surviving beyond that age is very small. In this equation, S 66 denotes the survival probability to age 66 conditional on having reached age 65, and r 2010 denotes the nominal interest rate projection (in this case for 2010) from the Social Security Administration as reported in the Board of Trustees (2008) . This calculation generates the actuarially fair annuity payout per year, P, that an insurance company could pay if it sought to break even in expected value when discounting using the interest rate series {r k }. Table 3 reports P as a percentage of the $100,000 annuity premium. Table 3 provides information on the annual payout as a percentage of the annuity premium for a $100,000 annuity purchase in the private market and in a synthetic actuarially fair annuity market for two cases: a nominal payout and a 3 percent escalating payout.
in Table 3 . For example, if a husband is age 65 and his wife is age 60, and he purchases in Table 3 . For example, if a husband is age 65 and his wife is age 60, and he purchases a joint and survivor annuity that will pay his wife half of the amount that he received a joint and survivor annuity that will pay his wife half of the amount that he received while alive if he predeceases her, he will receive an annual payout of 6.78 percent while alive if he predeceases her, he will receive an annual payout of 6.78 percent of the annuity premium if he chooses a nominal payout stream. If he chooses an of the annuity premium if he chooses a nominal payout stream. If he chooses an annuity stream with a 3 percent annual nominal increase, the initial payout will be annuity stream with a 3 percent annual nominal increase, the initial payout will be 4.80 percent of the purchase price. If he chooses no spousal protection, as noted 4.80 percent of the purchase price. If he chooses no spousal protection, as noted above, the payout rates will be 8.46 and 6.47 percent, respectively. above, the payout rates will be 8.46 and 6.47 percent, respectively. The amount of annuity income that a household can purchase is the product The amount of annuity income that a household can purchase is the product of the prevailing annuity payout rate and the household's holding of annuitizable of the prevailing annuity payout rate and the household's holding of annuitizable assets. For our calculations, we defi ne annuitizable wealth as the sum of assets in assets. For our calculations, we defi ne annuitizable wealth as the sum of assets in private retirement accounts and other fi nancial assets, minus nonhousing debt. private retirement accounts and other fi nancial assets, minus nonhousing debt. Figure 1 plots the distribution of annuitizable wealth by fi ve-percentile intervals of Figure 1 plots the distribution of annuitizable wealth by fi ve-percentile intervals of this wealth value for Health and Retirement Study households between the ages this wealth value for Health and Retirement Study households between the ages of 65 and 69 in 2008. The median retirement-age household has approximately of 65 and 69 in 2008. The median retirement-age household has approximately $50,000 in annuitizable wealth. Using the annuity payout rates above, a household $50,000 in annuitizable wealth. Using the annuity payout rates above, a household with this wealth level could purchase $3,000-$4,000 of annual annuity income, with this wealth level could purchase $3,000-$4,000 of annual annuity income, depending on the annuity product chosen. The 25 depending on the annuity product chosen. The 25 th th percentile of the annuitizable percentile of the annuitizable wealth distribution is just $600; at the 75 wealth distribution is just $600; at the 75 th th percentile, the annuitizable wealth value percentile, the annuitizable wealth value is $262,000. The top 5 percent of households, ranked by annuitizable wealth, have is $262,000. The top 5 percent of households, ranked by annuitizable wealth, have over $1 million in such wealth. over $1 million in such wealth. Figure 1 also shows the median value of equity in owner-occupied housing and Figure 1 also shows the median value of equity in owner-occupied housing and other real estate for households in each of the subgroups that were created by stratiother real estate for households in each of the subgroups that were created by stratifying on annuitizable assets. There is a positive correlation between median housing fying on annuitizable assets. There is a positive correlation between median housing and real estate equity within a group and the group's median fi nancial assets, but and real estate equity within a group and the group's median fi nancial assets, but there is also substantial heterogeneity within each group. there is also substantial heterogeneity within each group. Figure 1 suggests substantial variation in households' potential additional annu- Figure 1 suggests substantial variation in households' potential additional annuity income. For a large fraction of households, this amount is quite modest. Roughly ity income. For a large fraction of households, this amount is quite modest. Roughly one-third of households have zero, or very little, potential additional annuity income. one-third of households have zero, or very little, potential additional annuity income. Another one-third has less than $10,000 of potential additional annuity income. Another one-third has less than $10,000 of potential additional annuity income. However, for households in the top decile of potential additional annuity income, the However, for households in the top decile of potential additional annuity income, the median value is nearly $75,000. Of course, these calculations presume that households median value is nearly $75,000. Of course, these calculations presume that households annuitize annuitize all of their fi nancial assets and personal retirement account balances.
of their fi nancial assets and personal retirement account balances. It is important to remember that there is great heterogeneity across households It is important to remember that there is great heterogeneity across households in current annuity wealth, annuitizable wealth, and housing wealth. For example, in current annuity wealth, annuitizable wealth, and housing wealth. For example, if one stratifi es households by their Social Security wealth, private pension income if one stratifi es households by their Social Security wealth, private pension income is only an important component of current annuity income for those in the top is only an important component of current annuity income for those in the top three or four deciles. If households are divided into deciles based on their level of three or four deciles. If households are divided into deciles based on their level of current annuity wealth, including both Social Security and private pensions, the current annuity wealth, including both Social Security and private pensions, the 90 90 th th percentile of the annuitizable wealth distribution is greater than $200,000 percentile of the annuitizable wealth distribution is greater than $200,000 within every decile of the current annuity wealth distribution, and it exceeds $1,000,000 for of the current annuity wealth distribution, and it exceeds $1,000,000 for those whose current annuity wealth falls in the top 10 percent. those whose current annuity wealth falls in the top 10 percent.
Some of those with little annuitizable wealth already have substantial annuity Some of those with little annuitizable wealth already have substantial annuity wealth in the form of a defi ned benefi t pension. However, even among households wealth in the form of a defi ned benefi t pension. However, even among households with more than $20,000 in current annual annuity income, including both Social with more than $20,000 in current annual annuity income, including both Social Security and a defi ned benefi t private pension, a large fraction have only modest Security and a defi ned benefi t private pension, a large fraction have only modest levels of annuitizable wealth. Less than half of those in the $20,000-$30,000 current levels of annuitizable wealth. Less than half of those in the $20,000-$30,000 current annuity income interval have the potential to purchase an annuity that pays more annuity income interval have the potential to purchase an annuity that pays more than $10,000 per year, and only 40 percent of those with current annuity income of than $10,000 per year, and only 40 percent of those with current annuity income of more than $30,000 can increase their annuity income by more than $10,000. more than $30,000 can increase their annuity income by more than $10,000.
For 58 percent of households between the ages of 65 and 69, housing equity For 58 percent of households between the ages of 65 and 69, housing equity (including other real estate) is greater than the sum of fi nancial assets and assets (including other real estate) is greater than the sum of fi nancial assets and assets held in personal retirement accounts. This pattern is even more pronounced held in personal retirement accounts. This pattern is even more pronounced among households with low levels of total net worth. Table 2 showed that the among households with low levels of total net worth. Table 2 showed that the household at the 30 household at the 30 th th percentile of the housing equity distribution has $42,000 of percentile of the housing equity distribution has $42,000 of such equity, while the household at the 90 such equity, while the household at the 90 th th percentile has $585,000. For married percentile has $585,000. For married couples, the analogous values are $90,000 and $725,000, respectively. Recall from couples, the analogous values are $90,000 and $725,000, respectively. Recall from Figure 1 that median housing equity exceeds median annuitizable wealth in the Figure 1 that median housing equity exceeds median annuitizable wealth in the distribution of annuitizable wealth up to the 70 distribution of annuitizable wealth up to the 70 th th percentile. As a result, the disposipercentile. As a result, the disposition of housing equity in retirement may be a key determinant of late-life fi nancial tion of housing equity in retirement may be a key determinant of late-life fi nancial security for many households. security for many households.
A closer look at housing wealth shows great heterogeneity. When we stratify A closer look at housing wealth shows great heterogeneity. When we stratify households by current annuity wealth-that is, by the value of the sum of their Social households by current annuity wealth-that is, by the value of the sum of their Social Security and defi ned benefi t pensions-there is substantial dispersion of housing Security and defi ned benefi t pensions-there is substantial dispersion of housing wealth within each decile. For example, among households in the sixth current wealth within each decile. For example, among households in the sixth current annuity wealth decile, median housing wealth is $92,000, but the 95 annuity wealth decile, median housing wealth is $92,000, but the 95 th th percentile percentile value is $475,000. Similar degrees of dispersion are found in the other current value is $475,000. Similar degrees of dispersion are found in the other current annuity wealth deciles. Even for households in the group with no annuitizable annuity wealth deciles. Even for households in the group with no annuitizable assets, there is large variation in housing wealth and many have substantial housing assets, there is large variation in housing wealth and many have substantial housing equity. These results suggest many households with little potentially annuitizable equity. These results suggest many households with little potentially annuitizable wealth may have the capacity to draw on housing equity in the event of late-life wealth may have the capacity to draw on housing equity in the event of late-life fi nancial needs. fi nancial needs.
Shocks to Family Structure and the Drawdown of Post-Retirement Shocks to Family Structure and the Drawdown of Post-Retirement Wealth Wealth
We now examine the evolution of housing equity and fi nancial assets for houseWe now examine the evolution of housing equity and fi nancial assets for households in their retirement years. We are particularly interested in the extent to which holds in their retirement years. We are particularly interested in the extent to which households tap their housing equity and their fi nancial assets at various ages to households tap their housing equity and their fi nancial assets at various ages to fi nance consumption needs and other late-life spending. fi nance consumption needs and other late-life spending.
Several previous studies have examined the drawdown of housing assets at Several previous studies have examined the drawdown of housing assets at advanced ages. Venti and Wise (2004) study the evolution of housing equity in the advanced ages. Venti and Wise (2004) study the evolution of housing equity in the Health and Retirement Study and fi nd that housing equity tends to be conserved Health and Retirement Study and fi nd that housing equity tends to be conserved until a shock to family status such as the death of a spouse or entry to a nursing until a shock to family status such as the death of a spouse or entry to a nursing home. Their study looked at households in the original HRS cohort (household home. Their study looked at households in the original HRS cohort (household heads between the ages of 51 and 61 in 1992) between 1992 and 1998, and at Asset heads between the ages of 51 and 61 in 1992) between 1992 and 1998, and at Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) households (over the age and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) households (over the age of 70 in 1993) between 1993 and 1998. On average, among households that either of 70 in 1993) between 1993 and 1998. On average, among households that either moved or discontinued ownership, home equity increased by 0.28 percent annumoved or discontinued ownership, home equity increased by 0.28 percent annually among households in the relatively younger HRS cohort, while it declined ally among households in the relatively younger HRS cohort, while it declined 1.76 percent per year for the same category in the older AHEAD cohort. This is a 1.76 percent per year for the same category in the older AHEAD cohort. This is a weighted average of a 0.11 percent decline for two-person households that remain weighted average of a 0.11 percent decline for two-person households that remain intact, a 1.15 percent decline for one-person households that remain intact, and a intact, a 1.15 percent decline for one-person households that remain intact, and a 7.84 percent decline for households that experience a shock to family status, either 7.84 percent decline for households that experience a shock to family status, either through the death of a spouse or divorce. The results thus suggest that households through the death of a spouse or divorce. The results thus suggest that households do not tap home equity until well into retirement and that substantial declines in do not tap home equity until well into retirement and that substantial declines in housing wealth are often associated with shocks. Nakajima and Telyukova (2011) , and widowed or divorced in in adjacent waves (continuing one-person households), and widowed or divorced in adjacent waves. Figure 2 shows wave-to-wave changes in home equity for households adjacent waves. Figure 2 shows wave-to-wave changes in home equity for households between the ages of 51 to 61 in 1992. For two-person households that remain intact, between the ages of 51 to 61 in 1992. For two-person households that remain intact, the wave-to-wave change in home equity is positive in seven of the eight intervals. For the wave-to-wave change in home equity is positive in seven of the eight intervals. For one-person households, the change is positive in fi ve of the eight intervals. However, one-person households, the change is positive in fi ve of the eight intervals. However, households in which a spouse died or the couple was divorced between the waves households in which a spouse died or the couple was divorced between the waves of the survey see a sharp drop in home equity. We have studied, but do not present, of the survey see a sharp drop in home equity. We have studied, but do not present, the wave-to-wave changes in home ownership for the same family-status groups. As the wave-to-wave changes in home ownership for the same family-status groups. As with home equity, the effect of shocks to family status are revealed by the sharp drop with home equity, the effect of shocks to family status are revealed by the sharp drop in home ownership for the households who began an interval with two people and in home ownership for the households who began an interval with two people and ended the interval as one-person households. ended the interval as one-person households.
Home equity data for the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old Home equity data for the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) households are shown in Figure 3 . The AHEAD data also show a large (AHEAD) households are shown in Figure 3 . The AHEAD data also show a large drop in the home equity of households that transitioned from a two-person to a drop in the home equity of households that transitioned from a two-person to a one-person household during an interval compared to the change for continuing one-person household during an interval compared to the change for continuing two-person households. Further analysis shows that declines in home equity-even two-person households. Further analysis shows that declines in home equity-even among households that remain intact within an interval-are disproportionately among households that remain intact within an interval-are disproportionately accounted for by households that dissolve in the next interval. In other words, accounted for by households that dissolve in the next interval. In other words, at older ages, households reduce home equity in the interval preceding the at older ages, households reduce home equity in the interval preceding the transition from two to one person as well as in the interval when the transition transition from two to one person as well as in the interval when the transition occurs. To illustrate this point, consider continuing two-person households in the occurs. To illustrate this point, consider continuing two-person households in the 2004-2006 interval in the AHEAD data. The heads of these households were at 2004-2006 interval in the AHEAD data. The heads of these households were at least 83 years old by the end of the interval. The housing equity of households least 83 years old by the end of the interval. The housing equity of households that would dissolve in the 2006-2008 interval declined by 25.6 percent, but the that would dissolve in the 2006-2008 interval declined by 25.6 percent, but the housing equity of households that would not dissolve in the next interval declined housing equity of households that would not dissolve in the next interval declined by only 7.1 percent. by only 7.1 percent.
Our fi ndings suggest that there is relatively little withdrawal of housing equity Our fi ndings suggest that there is relatively little withdrawal of housing equity to purchase other assets, to buy annuities, or to support consumption in old age. to purchase other assets, to buy annuities, or to support consumption in old age. This fi nding is broadly consistent with other analyses of homeownership among This fi nding is broadly consistent with other analyses of homeownership among Most households do not use housing equity to maintain their preretirement Most households do not use housing equity to maintain their preretirement nonhousing standard of living after retirement, even though housing equity may nonhousing standard of living after retirement, even though housing equity may serve as a buffer that can be drawn down in low-probability, high-cost circumserve as a buffer that can be drawn down in low-probability, high-cost circumstances. Greenhalgh-Stanley's (2010) study fi nds that 59.9 percent of respondents stances. Greenhalgh-Stanley's (2010) study fi nds that 59.9 percent of respondents in the AHEAD survey who died between 1993 and 2004 were homeowners at the in the AHEAD survey who died between 1993 and 2004 were homeowners at the time of death. Davidoff (2009) suggests that the presence of substantial housing time of death. Davidoff (2009) suggests that the presence of substantial housing equity on many households' balance sheets may help to explain the limited equity on many households' balance sheets may help to explain the limited demand for annuity products. Those who hold housing wealth until very late in demand for annuity products. Those who hold housing wealth until very late in life may be less concerned than others, without such wealth, about the need to life may be less concerned than others, without such wealth, about the need to insure against longevity risk. insure against longevity risk. The slow drawdown of housing equity raises the question of how other compoThe slow drawdown of housing equity raises the question of how other components of the balance sheet evolve after retirement. There has been voluminous nents of the balance sheet evolve after retirement. There has been voluminous research on this topic, but the longitudinal data collected in the Health and Retireresearch on this topic, but the longitudinal data collected in the Health and Retirement Study provides some of the strongest information to date. Previous research ment Study provides some of the strongest information to date. Previous research using the HRS data suggests relatively little decline in fi nancial assets for many using the HRS data suggests relatively little decline in fi nancial assets for many households, at least in the early decades of retirement. For example, Smith, Soto, households, at least in the early decades of retirement. For example, Smith, Soto, and Penner (2009) combine housing equity with fi nancial assets to construct a and Penner (2009) combine housing equity with fi nancial assets to construct a measure of net worth. They fi nd that households in the top quintile of the wealth measure of net worth. They fi nd that households in the top quintile of the wealth distribution report rising net worth until about age 85, and that those in the middle distribution report rising net worth until about age 85, and that those in the middle three quintiles report relatively stable net worth. They fi nd some evidence that those three quintiles report relatively stable net worth. They fi nd some evidence that those in the lowest quintile draw down their non-annuitized wealth and rely in their later in the lowest quintile draw down their non-annuitized wealth and rely in their later years on the payouts from Social Security, defi ned benefi t pensions, and welfare. years on the payouts from Social Security, defi ned benefi t pensions, and welfare. Love, Palumbo, and Smith (2008) , who also analyze the Health and Retirement Love, Palumbo, and Smith (2008) , who also analyze the Health and Retirement Study data, create a measure of "annualized comprehensive wealth" that combines Study data, create a measure of "annualized comprehensive wealth" that combines fi nancial and housing wealth as well as the expected present discounted value of fi nancial and housing wealth as well as the expected present discounted value of annuities from Social Security and defi ned benefi t pensions. Using this measure, annuities from Social Security and defi ned benefi t pensions. Using this measure, for the median household, annualized comprehensive wealth rises with age, even for the median household, annualized comprehensive wealth rises with age, even though annuity wealth declines as a result of the declining number of expected though annuity wealth declines as a result of the declining number of expected remaining years of life. In Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2011) , we examine withdrawals remaining years of life. In Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2011) , we examine withdrawals from personal retirement accounts and fi nd a modest rate of withdrawal until from personal retirement accounts and fi nd a modest rate of withdrawal until account holders reach age 70½ and must begin required minimum distributions. account holders reach age 70½ and must begin required minimum distributions.
The same techniques that we use to study the drawdown in housing equity can The same techniques that we use to study the drawdown in housing equity can be used to examine the post-retirement evolution of annuitizable fi nancial assets. be used to examine the post-retirement evolution of annuitizable fi nancial assets. We consider all fi nancial assets held in taxable forms, plus Individual Retirement We consider all fi nancial assets held in taxable forms, plus Individual Retirement Account (IRA) and Keogh balances, less nonhousing debt, but exclude balances Account (IRA) and Keogh balances, less nonhousing debt, but exclude balances in 401(k) and similar accounts because the Health and Retirement Study data in 401(k) and similar accounts because the Health and Retirement Study data on these balances are incomplete. The results, shown in Figure 4 , resemble those on these balances are incomplete. The results, shown in Figure 4 , resemble those for housing equity. For example, for persons who were in households headed by for housing equity. For example, for persons who were in households headed by someone between the ages of 51 and 61 in 1992 and who remained in two-person someone between the ages of 51 and 61 in 1992 and who remained in two-person households between 1992 and 1994, median fi nancial assets increased from about households between 1992 and 1994, median fi nancial assets increased from about $37,000 to $51,000. For those in this group who remained in two-person households $37,000 to $51,000. For those in this group who remained in two-person households between 1994 and 1996, median assets declined from about $53,000 to $52,000. between 1994 and 1996, median assets declined from about $53,000 to $52,000. In most intervals, however, assets increased for continuing two-person households. In most intervals, however, assets increased for continuing two-person households.
Figure 4 Wave-to-Wave Changes in Median Net Financial Assets by Family Status, Original HRS Cohort (age 51-61 in 1992)
For one-person households, assets increased in some wave-to-wave intervals and For one-person households, assets increased in some wave-to-wave intervals and decreased in others, with declines most notable in the last two intervals. decreased in others, with declines most notable in the last two intervals.
When analyzing the evolution of household net worth, and especially fi nancial When analyzing the evolution of household net worth, and especially fi nancial assets, as a cohort of households ages, it is important to recognize the potential assets, as a cohort of households ages, it is important to recognize the potential impact of wealth-related differential mortality. Age-specifi c mortality rates are impact of wealth-related differential mortality. Age-specifi c mortality rates are negatively correlated with socioeconomic status, which means that as we track a negatively correlated with socioeconomic status, which means that as we track a given age cohort over time, the survivors will be disproportionately those who had given age cohort over time, the survivors will be disproportionately those who had higher wealth levels at earlier ages. We illustrate this point with an example. For higher wealth levels at earlier ages. We illustrate this point with an example. For two-person households present in both the 1996 and 1998 waves of the Health two-person households present in both the 1996 and 1998 waves of the Health and Retirement Study, median fi nancial assets in 1998 were $57,579. Two-person and Retirement Study, median fi nancial assets in 1998 were $57,579. Two-person households present in both the 1998 and 2000 waves, by comparison, had median households present in both the 1998 and 2000 waves, by comparison, had median fi nancial assets of $63,605 in 1998. This difference is circled in Figure 4 . The fi nancial assets of $63,605 in 1998. This difference is circled in Figure 4 . The difference between $63,605 and $57,579 is the mortality selection effect. Twodifference between $63,605 and $57,579 is the mortality selection effect. Twoperson households that dissolved, through either death or divorce, between 1998 person households that dissolved, through either death or divorce, between 1998 and 2000 had lower fi nancial assets at the start of this period than continuing and 2000 had lower fi nancial assets at the start of this period than continuing two-person households. The death selection effects are not so apparent for singletwo-person households. The death selection effects are not so apparent for singleperson households, mostly because a large fraction of one-person households had person households, mostly because a large fraction of one-person households had fi nancial assets of less than $10,000 in 1992. fi nancial assets of less than $10,000 in 1992.
For the generally older group of households in the Asset and Health Dynamics For the generally older group of households in the Asset and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) data-households headed by someone over Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) data-households headed by someone over the age of 70 in 1993-the mortality selection effects are extremely important. the age of 70 in 1993-the mortality selection effects are extremely important. Persons who continued in two-person households from one interval to the next Persons who continued in two-person households from one interval to the next typically held much greater balances in fi nancial assets than those who did not. typically held much greater balances in fi nancial assets than those who did not. Figure 5 demonstrates this point. The within-interval change in fi nancial assets for Figure 5 demonstrates this point. The within-interval change in fi nancial assets for continuing two-person households in the AHEAD data was positive in some intercontinuing two-person households in the AHEAD data was positive in some intervals and negative in others. On balance, however, the fi nancial assets of two-person vals and negative in others. On balance, however, the fi nancial assets of two-person households increased, and those with larger asset holdings in 1995 remained in the households increased, and those with larger asset holdings in 1995 remained in the sample longer than those with smaller balances. The fi nancial assets of continuing sample longer than those with smaller balances. The fi nancial assets of continuing one-person households were also positive in some intervals and negative in others, one-person households were also positive in some intervals and negative in others, but on balance increased over time due to selection effects. but on balance increased over time due to selection effects.
Shocks to Health: An Important Determinant of Wealth Dynamics Shocks to Health: An Important Determinant of Wealth Dynamics
The importance of changes in family status in the drawdown of both fi nancial The importance of changes in family status in the drawdown of both fi nancial and housing wealth suggests that "trigger events," such as death of a spouse or the and housing wealth suggests that "trigger events," such as death of a spouse or the onset of a medical condition, may play an important role in the evolution of houseonset of a medical condition, may play an important role in the evolution of household net worth. This section explores the role of late-life health status in affecting hold net worth. This section explores the role of late-life health status in affecting the path of wealth accumulation. the path of wealth accumulation.
Potentially expensive health shocks in late life are often cited as a key risk that Potentially expensive health shocks in late life are often cited as a key risk that households may insure against by holding assets in non-annuitized form. Palumbo households may insure against by holding assets in non-annuitized form. Palumbo (1999) , DeNardi, French, and Jones (2010), Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van (1999) , DeNardi, French, and Jones (2010), Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2011) , and others have incorporated information on the stochastic Nieuwerburgh (2011), and others have incorporated information on the stochastic process for out-of-pocket healthcare costs into life-cycle models. In these models, process for out-of-pocket healthcare costs into life-cycle models. In these models, households face multiple risks after retirement. The optimal life-cycle saving and households face multiple risks after retirement. The optimal life-cycle saving and consumption plan that emerges in this setting generally includes both a stock of consumption plan that emerges in this setting generally includes both a stock of fi nancial assets, held for precautionary reasons, and a stream of annuity payments. fi nancial assets, held for precautionary reasons, and a stream of annuity payments. Institutional details, such as those associated with the means-tested Medicaid Institutional details, such as those associated with the means-tested Medicaid program, which covers nursing home expenses after the household has spent program, which covers nursing home expenses after the household has spent down its own assets, can affect the optimal level of precautionary wealth holdings down its own assets, can affect the optimal level of precautionary wealth holdings and may be particularly important for those in lower tranches of the wealth distriand may be particularly important for those in lower tranches of the wealth distribution. Hurd and Rohwedder (2010) point out that at lower levels of the wealth bution. Hurd and Rohwedder (2010) point out that at lower levels of the wealth distribution, the fraction of households that appear to be adequately prepared for distribution, the fraction of households that appear to be adequately prepared for retirement can drop signifi cantly when the full distribution of potential medical retirement can drop signifi cantly when the full distribution of potential medical outlays, rather than the expected value, is included in the analysis. outlays, rather than the expected value, is included in the analysis.
When facing multiple risks, households need to balance the benefi ts of insuring When facing multiple risks, households need to balance the benefi ts of insuring against an unexpectedly long life by purchasing an annuity with the benefi ts of against an unexpectedly long life by purchasing an annuity with the benefi ts of holding a stock of non-annuitized wealth that can be used to cover the cost of unexholding a stock of non-annuitized wealth that can be used to cover the cost of unexpected health or other expenses. A substantial and growing literature, including pected health or other expenses. A substantial and growing literature, including work by Sinclair and Smetters (2004) , Turra and Mitchell (2004) , Ameriks, Caplin, work by Sinclair and Smetters (2004) , Turra and Mitchell (2004) , Ameriks, Caplin, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2008) , Davidoff (2009), and Peijnenburg, Nijman, Laufer, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2008) , Davidoff (2009), and Peijnenburg, Nijman, and Werker (2010) , provides insights on late-life fi nancial and consumption choices and Werker (2010) , provides insights on late-life fi nancial and consumption choices in this setting. in this setting.
The level and variance of unpredictable but potentially "necessary" late-life The level and variance of unpredictable but potentially "necessary" late-life expenditures for health or other needs, and the availability of insurance against expenditures for health or other needs, and the availability of insurance against such expenditures, is a key input to these models of post-retirement consumption such expenditures, is a key input to these models of post-retirement consumption behavior. Marshall, McGarry, and Skinner (2010) consider one of the most behavior. Marshall, McGarry, and Skinner (2010) consider one of the most important late-life expenditures, out-of-pocket medical costs. They use data for important late-life expenditures, out-of-pocket medical costs. They use data for the period 1998-2006 and estimate that median medical expenditures for Health the period 1998-2006 and estimate that median medical expenditures for Health and Retirement Study respondents in their last year of life were $5,061. They also and Retirement Study respondents in their last year of life were $5,061. They also consider the distribution of outlays, and fi nd that such spending was $29,335 at consider the distribution of outlays, and fi nd that such spending was $29,335 at the 90 the 90 th th percentile and $49,907 at the 95 percentile and $49,907 at the 95 th th percentile. They also fi nd that outpercentile. They also fi nd that outof-pocket expenditures are strongly positively correlated with both wealth and of-pocket expenditures are strongly positively correlated with both wealth and income. The mean outlay for those in the bottom wealth (income) quintile is income. The mean outlay for those in the bottom wealth (income) quintile is $7,173 ($9,046), compared with $18,233 ($14,269) for those in the top wealth $7,173 ($9,046), compared with $18,233 ($14,269) for those in the top wealth (income) quintile. (income) quintile. 4 4 DiNardi, French, and Jones (2010) consider medical expenditures at different DiNardi, French, and Jones (2010) consider medical expenditures at different ages, using AHEAD data, and fi nd that both the mean and the variation in medical ages, using AHEAD data, and fi nd that both the mean and the variation in medical expenses rise sharply at very old ages. For individuals between the ages of 95 and expenses rise sharply at very old ages. For individuals between the ages of 95 and 100, for example, they fi nd mean out-of-pocket medical spending of $9,227, with a 100, for example, they fi nd mean out-of-pocket medical spending of $9,227, with a standard deviation of $19,988-which points to a long right tail of high potential standard deviation of $19,988-which points to a long right tail of high potential outlays. They conclude that when the risk of uninsured late-life medical expendioutlays. They conclude that when the risk of uninsured late-life medical expenditures is combined with relatively standard models of life-cycle utility maximization, tures is combined with relatively standard models of life-cycle utility maximization, the optimal trajectory of wealth-holdings is relatively fl at through much of the the optimal trajectory of wealth-holdings is relatively fl at through much of the retirement period-households hold a stock of precautionary wealth and do not retirement period-households hold a stock of precautionary wealth and do not draw it down to any substantial extent. draw it down to any substantial extent.
Late-life medical costs tend to persist, so the appropriate measure of houseLate-life medical costs tend to persist, so the appropriate measure of household risk needs to look beyond potential outlays in a single year. Hubbard, Skinner, hold risk needs to look beyond potential outlays in a single year. Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995) estimate a fi rst-order autoregressive model for health outlays and Zeldes (1995) estimate a fi rst-order autoregressive model for health outlays using data from the late 1970s, and they fi nd an autoregressive coeffi cient of 0.901. using data from the late 1970s, and they fi nd an autoregressive coeffi cient of 0.901. This implies that on average, a cost shock this year will raise costs next year by This implies that on average, a cost shock this year will raise costs next year by about 90 percent of the current increase, and raise costs in two years by more about 90 percent of the current increase, and raise costs in two years by more than 80 percent of the current increase. DiNardi, French, and Jones (2010) also than 80 percent of the current increase. DiNardi, French, and Jones (2010) also decompose healthcare spending into a transitory and a permanent component; the decompose healthcare spending into a transitory and a permanent component; the permanent component has a fi rst-order autoregressive coeffi cient of 0.922. Thus, a permanent component has a fi rst-order autoregressive coeffi cient of 0.922. Thus, a forward-looking household would rationally prepare for a nontrivial probability of forward-looking household would rationally prepare for a nontrivial probability of substantial and persistent medical care spending at advanced ages. substantial and persistent medical care spending at advanced ages.
A key component of late-life medical spending is long-term care, which is A key component of late-life medical spending is long-term care, which is discussed in detail by Brown and Finkelstein in this symposium. They report that discussed in detail by Brown and Finkelstein in this symposium. They report that long-term care accounts for roughly 9 percent of total health expenditures in long-term care accounts for roughly 9 percent of total health expenditures in the United States, and that almost one-third of the cost of this care is paid for by the United States, and that almost one-third of the cost of this care is paid for by the care recipients. They cite data suggesting that between 35 and 50 percent of the care recipients. They cite data suggesting that between 35 and 50 percent of those who reach age 65 will experience a nursing home stay at some point before those who reach age 65 will experience a nursing home stay at some point before they die, with a chance of between 10 and 20 percent of spending more than fi ve they die, with a chance of between 10 and 20 percent of spending more than fi ve years in a nursing home. Although the cost of a nursing home stay averages $6,000 years in a nursing home. Although the cost of a nursing home stay averages $6,000 per month, for several reasons, including the interaction between private long-term per month, for several reasons, including the interaction between private long-term care policies and the Medicaid program, the market for private long-term insurance care policies and the Medicaid program, the market for private long-term insurance policies is small. policies is small.
If households are saving in part to prepare for the costs associated with adverse If households are saving in part to prepare for the costs associated with adverse health shocks, then one would expect to fi nd important wealth changes coincident health shocks, then one would expect to fi nd important wealth changes coincident with health shocks. A large literature on the correlation between health and wealth with health shocks. A large literature on the correlation between health and wealth is broadly supportive of this proposition. Smith (1999) documents a cross-sectional is broadly supportive of this proposition. Smith (1999) documents a cross-sectional wealth-health gradient in all age groups using data from the Panel Survey of wealth-health gradient in all age groups using data from the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics. Smith (2004) studies households that experience major health Income Dynamics. Smith (2004) studies households that experience major health shocks-the onset of cancer or a cardio-pulmonary disorder-as well as those who shocks-the onset of cancer or a cardio-pulmonary disorder-as well as those who face minor health shocks. He fi nds a substantial cumulative effect of these shocks on face minor health shocks. He fi nds a substantial cumulative effect of these shocks on income; such income effects are likely in turn to affect wealth. The effect is larger for income; such income effects are likely in turn to affect wealth. The effect is larger for major than for minor health shocks. Adams, Hurd, McFadden, Merrill, and Ribeiro major than for minor health shocks. Adams, Hurd, McFadden, Merrill, and Ribeiro (2003) and Michaud and van Soest (2008) explore possible causation from wealth (2003) and Michaud and van Soest (2008) explore possible causation from wealth to health, and from health to wealth, and fi nd that especially for older households to health, and from health to wealth, and fi nd that especially for older households the causation from health to wealth appears to be the dominant pathway. Wu (2003) the causation from health to wealth appears to be the dominant pathway. Wu (2003) documents substantial declines in wealth following health shocks, and shows that documents substantial declines in wealth following health shocks, and shows that in married couples, the adverse effect beyond the effect of lost earnings is much in married couples, the adverse effect beyond the effect of lost earnings is much larger when women become sick than when men experience a health shock. Coile larger when women become sick than when men experience a health shock. Coile and Milligan (2009) fi nd that health shocks are correlated with changes in portfolio and Milligan (2009) fi nd that health shocks are correlated with changes in portfolio structure for retired households, although the impact on total household wealth is structure for retired households, although the impact on total household wealth is diffi cult to evaluate. diffi cult to evaluate.
In Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2010) , we explore health and wealth linkages In Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2010) , we explore health and wealth linkages further. We use data on a number of self-reported health attributes in the Health further. We use data on a number of self-reported health attributes in the Health and Retirement Study to construct a "latent health index" for each individual and Retirement Study to construct a "latent health index" for each individual respondent. This index is highly correlated with various health-related outcomes, respondent. This index is highly correlated with various health-related outcomes, such as mortality. We then study the evolution of household net worth-the sum of such as mortality. We then study the evolution of household net worth-the sum of fi nancial wealth, assets in personal retirement accounts, and housing equity-for fi nancial wealth, assets in personal retirement accounts, and housing equity-for households in various quintiles of the latent health distribution. households in various quintiles of the latent health distribution.
As the voluminous prior literature would suggest, we fi nd a strong correlation As the voluminous prior literature would suggest, we fi nd a strong correlation between health status and net worth in the cross-section of households. In 1992, between health status and net worth in the cross-section of households. In 1992, when the respondents in the Health and Retirement Study are between the ages when the respondents in the Health and Retirement Study are between the ages of 51 and 61, the net worth of those in the highest health quintile is more than of 51 and 61, the net worth of those in the highest health quintile is more than double that of the lowest health quintile. The wealth dispersion across health quindouble that of the lowest health quintile. The wealth dispersion across health quintiles increases as the cohort ages. In 2000, for example, "predicted mean assets," tiles increases as the cohort ages. In 2000, for example, "predicted mean assets," computed as the fi tted value from a regression, are roughly $200,000 for those in computed as the fi tted value from a regression, are roughly $200,000 for those in the lowest health quintile, but more than $500,000 for those in the second-highest the lowest health quintile, but more than $500,000 for those in the second-highest quintile, and over $600,000 for those in the healthiest quintile. quintile, and over $600,000 for those in the healthiest quintile.
Changes in health status seem to be associated with changes in household net Changes in health status seem to be associated with changes in household net worth. For example, in a regression of the level of assets in one wave of the Health worth. For example, in a regression of the level of assets in one wave of the Health and Retirement Study, in this case the 2000 wave, on assets in the previous wave, and Retirement Study, in this case the 2000 wave, on assets in the previous wave, the household's health status percentile in the previous wave, and the the household's health status percentile in the previous wave, and the change in in health status percentile between the two waves, the estimates imply that for each health status percentile between the two waves, the estimates imply that for each one percentile drop in health status, household wealth drops by $18,744. While one percentile drop in health status, household wealth drops by $18,744. While further study is needed, this result suggests that wealth is affected not just by the further study is needed, this result suggests that wealth is affected not just by the level of health, but also by its changes. level of health, but also by its changes.
Our study does not explain why wealth rises more rapidly for healthier houseOur study does not explain why wealth rises more rapidly for healthier households than for those in poor health. Out-of-pocket medical expenditures are holds than for those in poor health. Out-of-pocket medical expenditures are also likely to be higher for those in poorer health-which is the linkage between also likely to be higher for those in poorer health-which is the linkage between health and wealth that has been the primary focus in many previous studies. But health and wealth that has been the primary focus in many previous studies. But in addition, for households in their 50s and 60s, poor health may reduce labor in addition, for households in their 50s and 60s, poor health may reduce labor force activity, not just for the unhealthy spouse but for the healthy spouse as well force activity, not just for the unhealthy spouse but for the healthy spouse as well if there are care-giving responsibilities. Reduced labor market activity may result if there are care-giving responsibilities. Reduced labor market activity may result in lower income during traditional working years as well as lower levels of annuity in lower income during traditional working years as well as lower levels of annuity benefi ts from Social Security and defi ned benefi t pension plans in retirement. It is benefi ts from Social Security and defi ned benefi t pension plans in retirement. It is also possible that poor health may induce a demand for nonmedical outlays, such also possible that poor health may induce a demand for nonmedical outlays, such as home remodeling to accommodate activity limitations. We conclude that past as home remodeling to accommodate activity limitations. We conclude that past studies of the cost of poor health in late life may have underestimated the risks studies of the cost of poor health in late life may have underestimated the risks that households face from adverse health shocks. This insight may be important that households face from adverse health shocks. This insight may be important when trying to calibrate models in which households face competing risks and must when trying to calibrate models in which households face competing risks and must decide how to insure against each. decide how to insure against each.
Conclusion Conclusion
Our analysis of the composition of wealth at retirement and the drawdown of Our analysis of the composition of wealth at retirement and the drawdown of wealth in the early years of retirement suggests several conclusions. wealth in the early years of retirement suggests several conclusions.
First, many households reach retirement with relatively little fi nancial wealth First, many households reach retirement with relatively little fi nancial wealth to support their retirement needs. Half of all households headed by someone to support their retirement needs. Half of all households headed by someone between the ages of 65 and 69 in 2008 had total fi nancial assets, including assets between the ages of 65 and 69 in 2008 had total fi nancial assets, including assets in IRAs and 401(k)s, of less than $52,000. Many providers of single-premium in IRAs and 401(k)s, of less than $52,000. Many providers of single-premium immediate annuities require minimum investments. Forty-three percent of the immediate annuities require minimum investments. Forty-three percent of the households aged 65 to 69 would not be able to make a $25,000 minimum investhouseholds aged 65 to 69 would not be able to make a $25,000 minimum investment even if they liquidated all of their fi nancial assets, including personal ment even if they liquidated all of their fi nancial assets, including personal retirement accounts. retirement accounts.
Second, for the minority of households that reach retirement with substanSecond, for the minority of households that reach retirement with substantial fi nancial assets, the late-life fi nancial planning problem is multifaceted. Thirty tial fi nancial assets, the late-life fi nancial planning problem is multifaceted. Thirty percent of retirement-age households have non-annuitized wealth of more than percent of retirement-age households have non-annuitized wealth of more than $518,000. For these households, the three most important risks in their retire-$518,000. For these households, the three most important risks in their retirement years are likely to be longevity risk, uninsured late-life medical expenses, and ment years are likely to be longevity risk, uninsured late-life medical expenses, and unfavorable returns on their portfolio assets or their housing investments. There is unfavorable returns on their portfolio assets or their housing investments. There is relatively little evidence that households in the upper half of the wealth distribution relatively little evidence that households in the upper half of the wealth distribution spend down fi nancial assets in the early decades of retirement. spend down fi nancial assets in the early decades of retirement.
Third, most households appear to treat their houses as a source of reserve Third, most households appear to treat their houses as a source of reserve wealth that can be tapped in the event of a substantial expense-for example, a wealth that can be tapped in the event of a substantial expense-for example, a healthcare need-rather than a source of annual income. The potential to sell one's healthcare need-rather than a source of annual income. The potential to sell one's home and to redeploy the proceeds, which offers a precautionary wealth stock, may home and to redeploy the proceeds, which offers a precautionary wealth stock, may also contribute to the limited demand for private annuities. also contribute to the limited demand for private annuities.
Looking ahead, one important issue that has not been adequately addressed Looking ahead, one important issue that has not been adequately addressed is how households with enough wealth to confront meaningful fi nancial decisions is how households with enough wealth to confront meaningful fi nancial decisions in retirement perceive the risks that they face. Are they making choices based on in retirement perceive the risks that they face. Are they making choices based on a reasonable degree of information and rationality? Or are they making decisions a reasonable degree of information and rationality? Or are they making decisions based on other factors? based on other factors?
These questions are particularly relevant in evaluating decisions about These questions are particularly relevant in evaluating decisions about whether to purchase annuities. The available evidence is divided on the extent to whether to purchase annuities. The available evidence is divided on the extent to which households have a reasonable understanding of annuity decisions. On one which households have a reasonable understanding of annuity decisions. On one side, several studies suggest that households have at least a rudimentary underside, several studies suggest that households have at least a rudimentary understanding of the role of annuities in providing longevity insurance. Brown (2001) standing of the role of annuities in providing longevity insurance. Brown (2001) fi nds that some households recognize the trade-offs associated with life-contingent fi nds that some households recognize the trade-offs associated with life-contingent payouts. Bütler and Staubli (2010) fi nd that in Switzerland, a nation with a high payouts. Bütler and Staubli (2010) fi nd that in Switzerland, a nation with a high annuitization rate for pension payouts, variation in the "money's worth" of pension annuitization rate for pension payouts, variation in the "money's worth" of pension annuities and in the extent to which a pension annuity would reduce the value of annuities and in the extent to which a pension annuity would reduce the value of means-tested transfer payments is correlated with choices between an annuity and means-tested transfer payments is correlated with choices between an annuity and a lump-sum payout. a lump-sum payout.
Other studies, however, suggest that annuity decisions are excessively sensitive Other studies, however, suggest that annuity decisions are excessively sensitive to nonfi nancial considerations. Chalmers and Reuter (2009) study decisions by to nonfi nancial considerations. Chalmers and Reuter (2009) study decisions by public sector workers in Oregon and fi nd that households appear to understand public sector workers in Oregon and fi nd that households appear to understand how some factors, such as poor health, affect the attractiveness of annuities but how some factors, such as poor health, affect the attractiveness of annuities but have diffi culty valuing life annuities and comparing them with lump-sum payouts. have diffi culty valuing life annuities and comparing them with lump-sum payouts. Brown, Kling, Mullainathan, and Wrobel (2008) show that many households view Brown, Kling, Mullainathan, and Wrobel (2008) show that many households view annuities as investment products and consequently see them as risky since they offer annuities as investment products and consequently see them as risky since they offer low returns in the event of a premature death. When these products are described low returns in the event of a premature death. When these products are described instead as a form of insurance against outliving one's resources, interest in them instead as a form of insurance against outliving one's resources, interest in them increases. Agnew, Anderson, Gerlach, and Szykman (2008) and Brown, Kapteyn, increases. Agnew, Anderson, Gerlach, and Szykman (2008) and Brown, Kapteyn, and Mitchell (2011) fi nd that choices between annuitized payouts and lump-sum and Mitchell (2011) fi nd that choices between annuitized payouts and lump-sum distributions are infl uenced by the nature of the information that households are distributions are infl uenced by the nature of the information that households are provided. Thus, one important policy question is how best to provide information provided. Thus, one important policy question is how best to provide information that will enable households to make well-informed choices about their retirement that will enable households to make well-informed choices about their retirement income options. income options.
Survey evidence provides some information on the way households perceive the Survey evidence provides some information on the way households perceive the risks that they face in retirement. The Society of Actuaries (2010) collected informarisks that they face in retirement. The Society of Actuaries (2010) collected information on concerns about post-retirement fi nancial circumstances with a telephone tion on concerns about post-retirement fi nancial circumstances with a telephone survey of 804 households. Only 11 percent of retired respondents indicated that they survey of 804 households. Only 11 percent of retired respondents indicated that they were planning to use home equity to fi nance their retirement. Thirty-six percent of were planning to use home equity to fi nance their retirement. Thirty-six percent of retirees indicated that they did not have a "set plan" for drawing down their savings, retirees indicated that they did not have a "set plan" for drawing down their savings, but use them "as needed." Twenty-four percent indicated that they viewed their but use them "as needed." Twenty-four percent indicated that they viewed their savings as funds to be used to pay for emergencies only. Only 4 percent planned savings as funds to be used to pay for emergencies only. Only 4 percent planned to never draw down savings because they wanted to pass assets to their heirs. When to never draw down savings because they wanted to pass assets to their heirs. When asked about risks, 58 percent of retirees indicated that they were worried that they asked about risks, 58 percent of retirees indicated that they were worried that they would not be able to preserve the infl ation-adjusted value of their savings, 48 percent would not be able to preserve the infl ation-adjusted value of their savings, 48 percent indicated that they might not have enough money to pay for adequate health care, indicated that they might not have enough money to pay for adequate health care, 46 percent indicated that they might not be able to pay for a stay in a nursing home, 46 percent indicated that they might not be able to pay for a stay in a nursing home, and 46 percent indicated that they might deplete all of their savings. Forty-four and 46 percent indicated that they might deplete all of their savings. Forty-four percent expressed concern that they might not have enough money to maintain a percent expressed concern that they might not have enough money to maintain a reasonable standard of living for the rest of their life. Twenty-four percent of retirees reasonable standard of living for the rest of their life. Twenty-four percent of retirees indicated that they had chosen the lifetime income option from an employee retireindicated that they had chosen the lifetime income option from an employee retirement plan or that they planned to do so. These survey fi ndings support our general ment plan or that they planned to do so. These survey fi ndings support our general observation that most households are trying to deal with multiple sources of risk observation that most households are trying to deal with multiple sources of risk during their retirement years. during their retirement years.
Because the fi nancial choices confronting households during both their Because the fi nancial choices confronting households during both their wealth accumulation period and their retirement years are complex, many areas wealth accumulation period and their retirement years are complex, many areas of retirement planning have focused on "default options" of various kinds. Such of retirement planning have focused on "default options" of various kinds. Such defaults typically assign households a particular choice, while allowing them defaults typically assign households a particular choice, while allowing them to "opt out" if they so choose. Given the apparent diffi culty of formulating an to "opt out" if they so choose. Given the apparent diffi culty of formulating an optimal retirement saving plan, as well as the challenge of deciding whether to optimal retirement saving plan, as well as the challenge of deciding whether to annuitize wealth at retirement, it seems likely that default options would affect annuitize wealth at retirement, it seems likely that default options would affect the choices of many households. A number of recent proposals have called the choices of many households. A number of recent proposals have called for annuity defaults or for mandatory annuitization of some share of balances for annuity defaults or for mandatory annuitization of some share of balances in 401(k) and other defi ned contribution plans. Our fi ndings suggest caution in 401(k) and other defi ned contribution plans. Our fi ndings suggest caution in applying a "one-size-fi ts-all" approach to all retirees. A household's preferences in applying a "one-size-fi ts-all" approach to all retirees. A household's preferences regarding different payout streams may depend on its wealth, its planned future regarding different payout streams may depend on its wealth, its planned future expenditures, and the range of uncertain potential outlays that it faces. It may be expenditures, and the range of uncertain potential outlays that it faces. It may be possible to design default options with suffi cient fl exibility to address such issues. possible to design default options with suffi cient fl exibility to address such issues. If not, defaults may improve the situation for some households while reducing If not, defaults may improve the situation for some households while reducing welfare for others. welfare for others.
In the decades ahead, fi nancial pressures on entitlement programs such as In the decades ahead, fi nancial pressures on entitlement programs such as Social Security and Medicare may shift an increasing share of late-life risks from Social Security and Medicare may shift an increasing share of late-life risks from governments to households, at least for those in the upper strata of the income and governments to households, at least for those in the upper strata of the income and wealth distribution. An increase in the degree of means-testing in these programs wealth distribution. An increase in the degree of means-testing in these programs would raise the importance of private insurance of all types. If the cost of medical would raise the importance of private insurance of all types. If the cost of medical care continues to increase, the risk of late-life healthcare costs will weigh more care continues to increase, the risk of late-life healthcare costs will weigh more heavily, too. These considerations highlight one of the most diffi cult challenges heavily, too. These considerations highlight one of the most diffi cult challenges facing retirement-age households who are formulating their fi nancial plans: the facing retirement-age households who are formulating their fi nancial plans: the need to forecast government policies, as well as key future expenses, for three or need to forecast government policies, as well as key future expenses, for three or four decades into the future. four decades into the future.
